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Abstract
The British sometimes use the phrase “safe as houses” to describe a sure bet or an investment that carries little
to no risk. Until a few years ago, this expression held true in America as well, where housing prices had done
nothing but steadily rise since the Great Depression, and the general public considered a home to be one of
the best investments possible. As the nation headed into a new Millennium, mortgage loans were easy to come
by and housing prices soared while the economy appeared to thrive. The government strongly encouraged
Americans to own their own home, and with banks devising creative methods to make money off mortgage
loans, everyone appeared to win. However, the seemingly stable economy was belied by the underlying
fundamentals, leading to a global financial shakeup that has changed the way we perceive the economy. This
paper will trace the housing crisis to its roots and examine how it impacted the broader American economy,
bringing us to our current financial situation of a depressed housing market and lingering unemployment.
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CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
U.S. HOUSING CRISIS
Nick Kenaga
I. INTRODUCTION
 The British sometimes use the phrase 
“safe as houses” to describe a sure bet or an in-
vestment that carries little to no risk.  Until a few 
years ago, this expression held true in America 
as well, where housing prices had done nothing 
but steadily rise since the Great Depression, and 
the general public considered a home to be one 
of the best investments possible.  As the nation 
headed into a new Millennium, mortgage loans 
were easy to come by and housing prices soared 
while the economy appeared to thrive.  The gov-
ernment strongly encouraged Americans to own 
their own home, and with banks devising creative 
methods to make money off mortgage loans, 
everyone appeared to win.  However, the seem-
ingly stable economy was belied by the under-
lying fundamentals, leading to a global financial 
shakeup that has changed the way we perceive 
the economy.  This paper will trace the housing 
crisis to its roots and examine how it impacted the 
broader American economy, bringing us to our 
current financial situation of a depressed housing 
market and lingering unemployment. 
II. BACKGROUND/CAUSES
 The catalyst for the housing bust was the 
vast increase in subprime mortgage loans, which 
are loans given to borrowers with less than stellar 
credit history.  Originally considered an anomaly 
within the real estate market, a multitude of fac-
tors caused the market for subprime mortgages 
to grow rapidly.  The first innovation that helped 
spur the market’s development was the vast 
technological improvement of the 1980s, which 
changed the mortgage underwriting process. 
Originally, the home mortgage lending business 
was the responsibility of community banks.  Cut-
and-dried formulas involving debt-to-income ra-
tio, amount of savings in the bank, and size of the 
down payment were used to determine whether 
a mortgage applicant qualified for a loan.  Af-
ter the computer arrived on the business scene, 
statisticians could analyze the vast amounts of 
data on borrowers and lenders to come up with 
models for determining default risk for individual 
buyers, which became known as automated 
underwriting (AU).  Now, rather than waiting a 
week to get a loan approved, prospective bor-
rowers could find out whether they qualified in 
a matter of seconds.  Furthermore, AU software 
reduced underwriting costs, on average, by $916 
per loan (Engel, McCoy, 2011).  The decrease in 
costs gave banks incentive to expand lending. It 
did not yet matter to them that the AU model was 
only meant to be applied to the prime mortgage 
market.
 In addition to the technology that was 
revolutionizing the financial world, some devel-
opments were happening in the United States to 
set the stage for the rise and fall of the housing 
market.  After the September 11 attacks and the 
burst of the dot-com bubble, the U.S. entered a 
recession.  Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Board, brought the target 
federal funds rate, the rate at which banks lend 
to each other on the overnight market, down to 
one percent in June 2003, a record low (New York 
Fed).  Meanwhile, trade surpluses in China and 
other commodity-producing nations created an 
excess of dollars in foreign countries. Much of this 
excess returned to the U.S. as foreign investors 
bought Treasury bonds, which are considered to 
be one of the safest investments available (Zandi, 
2009).  This healthy demand helped to push down 
yields, delivering a low return on government 
bonds.  Combined with abundance of cheap 
credit, investors’ appetite for risk increased.  Seek-
ing to develop new types of marketable securi-
ties, financial firms increasingly began securitizing 
subprime mortgage loans, and the market took 
off.  Sub or near-prime loans swelled from 9 per-
cent of newly originated mortgage-backed se-
curities (MBS) in 2001 to 40 percent in 2006 (DiMar-
tino, Duca, 2007).  As housing prices continued to 
rise while inflation was kept in check, Greenspan 
was lauded as a genius.
 The idea to securitize mortgage loans was 
hardly new.  A lender would bundle their mort-
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gage loans, then repackage them as bonds that 
could be rated by credit rating agencies. Then 
the lender would sell the bonds—which were 
backed by the mortgages as collateral—to inves-
tors.  Borrowers’ mortgage payments became the 
investors’ interest payments.  This had been done 
since the 1970s by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) that later 
became private corporations.  Turning mortgage 
loans into bonds solved the long-time problem 
that banks had of “lending long and borrowing 
short”; in other words, needing to finance long-
term mortgage loans with short-term demand 
deposits.  If interest rates rose, banks would need 
to pay clients a higher rate on deposits than bor-
rowers were paying on their fixed-rate mortgage 
loans.  If interest rates fell, borrowers would sim-
ply refinance at a lower rate.  With securitization, 
banks were less subject to interest rate fluctuations 
because the mortgages were sold and passed 
off to other parties.  Fannie and Freddie were suc-
cessful in securitizing mortgages that were origi-
nated by the lenders, but eventually, investment 
banks sought to become involved in the under-
writing process as well.  By then, nearly everyone 
who qualified for a mortgage already had one, so 
the banks began securitizing subprime loans, thus 
linking Wall Street with Main Street.  Some of them 
even began to originate their own loans, and by 
2006, up to 80 percent of all subprime loans were 
being securitized (Engel, McCoy, 2011).  The fi-
nancial intermediaries who securitized the loans 
often repackaged them into collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), which separated mortgages 
into separate “tranches” that allowed investors 
different rates of risk and return, from AAA down 
to junk status.
 At the peak of the housing market in 2006-
07, the CDOs were immensely popular, and invest-
ment banks issued over $200 billion of risky MBS 
and made huge profits.  Investors holding the saf-
est tranches of CDOs could have their securities 
guaranteed by a company like insurance giant 
AIG, which calculated a 0.15 percent risk of loss 
and insured massive quantities of CDOs by selling 
what were known as credit default swaps (CDS) 
(Engel, McCoy, 2011).  Even after paying an insur-
ance fee, CDO investors (mostly banks) still got a 
return that easily beat that of Treasury bonds on an 
investment that was thought to be equally safe. 
Financial institutions that packaged the loans 
reaped huge service fees that were unrelated to 
the performance of the loans, so they cared little 
about how risky they were.  This also illustrates the 
rise of the “shadow banking” industry, which is the 
blending of commercial and investment banking 
(Ghosh, 2011).  By allowing commercial banks to 
participate in underwriting and issuing of securi-
ties, they could engage in risky activities with the 
funds of their depositors because they knew that 
they would be backed by the FDIC, the govern-
ment’s deposit insurance program.  The gross lack 
of checks and balances in this model began to 
be exposed in 2007 as housing prices started to 
go down. 
III. MARKET COLLAPSE
 As interest rates began to rise, the hous-
ing market finally began to cool off.  When home 
prices declined, many homeowners who had put 
little to no money down, now had negative equity 
in their homes (owing more money on their mort-
gage than what their homes were worth) so they 
had incentive to walk away from their homes.  In 
addition to this, a growing number of subprime 
borrowers could no longer afford their mortgage 
payments, and default rates skyrocketed.  The re-
sult was for prices to fall even further, along with 
the value of MBS, which were derived from home 
values.  The new Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke, 
seemed unconcerned at first, stating in June 
2007 that “the troubles in the subprime section 
seem unlikely to seriously spill over to the broad-
er economy or the financial sector” (Bernanke, 
2007).  By March 2008, however, the U.S. was in 
financial turmoil as Bear Stearns, an investment 
bank that was heavily invested in the residential 
mortgage market, was brought to the brink of 
collapse.  Financial institutions that did business 
with it began withdrawing their funds, and the 
Federal Reserve had to arrange for J.P. Morgan 
Chase to acquire Bear Stearns for pennies on the 
dollar.  The balance sheets of financial firms be-
gan to deteriorate with the collapse of the hous-
ing and mortgage market. Financial firms started 
deleveraging because they were afraid to lend 
to each other, households, or businesses and thus 
economic activity slowed down.  By September, 
the government announced that it was putting 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservator-
ship, officially taking them over.  Fannie and Fred-
die originally had dealt mostly in prime loans, but 
during the boom of the subprime market, they lost 
market share to competitors that were taking on 
greater risks.  Also, they had been pressured by 
Congress to increase their mortgage purchases 
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from low-income borrowers as part of the govern-
ment initiative to boost home ownership (Engel, 
McCoy, 2011).  When outside auditors examined 
the books, they found the GSEs used accounting 
tricks to hide the fact they had virtually no capital 
cushion, and the government was forced to take 
them over.
 As the magnitude of the impending crisis 
became evident, the rest of the financial institu-
tions began to fall like dominoes.  Lehman Brothers, 
another bank that was loaded with “toxic assets,” 
securitized loans that went sour, was brought to 
the brink of failure.  When it was clear that Lehm-
an was not getting federal help, Merrill Lynch real-
ized it too would collapse and arranged for Bank 
of America to take it over.  After Lehman filed 
for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, markets 
everywhere crashed and global financial Arma-
geddon seemed likely.  Then the Federal Reserve 
spent $85 billion on a bailout of AIG, in response 
to the failure of its recklessly issued credit default 
swaps.  Had AIG gone under, the repercussions 
would have been many times worse than that of 
Lehman, due to the countless banks and mutual 
funds that did business with AIG and would have 
instantly defaulted.  In essence, it helped ame-
liorate financial “contagion,” in which the failure 
of an important institution triggers a mass panic. 
In a chaotic flight to quality, investors snapped 
up Treasury securities, and the spread between 
Treasury and BAA-rated corporate bonds spiked. 
Shown in Figure 1, the higher the spread between 
their yields, the more risk-averse investors are at 
a given time.  The wide yield spread illustrated 
the fear that permeated the market at the time. 
Then came the Congressional legislation: a $700 
billion emergency bank bailout package to sta-
bilize the financial sector.  The bailout, known as 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), was the 
first of many financial reforms that Congress has 
passed since the crisis.  In 2010, for example, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act was passed 
to promote stability and increase oversight in the 
financial services industry, along with protecting 
the rights of consumers.
IV. AFTERMATH/POLICY MEASURES
 The crisis is a reminder of the role that 
asymmetric information plays in financial markets, 
and in that regard can be examined for its effect 
on individuals.  For example, the glut of subprime 
mortgages that originated during the housing 
bubble is an example of adverse selection be-
cause risks that were not creditworthy were im-
properly screened.  The result of this is that after 
the financial crisis, banks see too much risk to pro-
vide many loans, even to individuals with excel-
lent credit.  The lack of funds available to finance 
economic activity explains the credit freeze, and 
contributes to the difficult job market.
 The behavior of the U.S. consumer also 
changed greatly; before the crisis, Americans 
had taken on excessive debt, as the personal sav-
ings rate fell to all-time lows (Figure 2).  This lever-
aged consumption helped drive gross domestic 
product (GDP) when the economy thrived, but 
when deleveraging finally began, the lack of de-
mand rippled through the economy.  Households 
also saw significant deterioration in their balance 
sheets as the value of their homes, probably their 
most valuable asset, plummeted.  The evapora-
tion of wealth on the housing side can be seen 
in Figure 3, which indexes consumer prices (CPI), 
a measure of inflation, along with housing prices 
over the past decade.  While the spread between 
the two was significant during the peak of the 
bubble, after the precipitous decline in home val-
ues the two lines converge such that the increase 
in housing prices over the past decade is merely 
commensurate with the rate of inflation.
 Meanwhile, the Fed is still trying to exercise 
its monetary policy options to help the economy. 
The target federal funds rate has essentially been 
zero since the end of 2008, and the Fed has con-
ducted open market operations of buying short-
term U.S. Treasury bills to increase the money sup-
ply, both measures intended to spur economic 
activity.  With traditional methods seemingly ex-
hausted, the Fed then turned to buying toxic as-
sets off of banks’ balance sheets, hoping to re-
capitalize them and encourage lending.  It also 
has engaged in a $600 billion round of  “quanti-
tative easing,” a policy where the central bank 
purchases bonds of longer maturities in order to 
bring down their yields.  More recently, they have 
announced “Operation Twist,” a plan to sell some 
of their bonds of short- or medium-term maturities 
in order to buy bonds of longer maturities.  With 
interest rates on shorter-term bonds near zero, the 
intuition is for the Fed to try to affect mortgage 
rates, which are tied to the rates on longer-term 
bonds, such as the 10-year Treasury.  However, the 
interest rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage dipped 
below four percent in October 2011, a record low, 
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so it is unclear if the plan will achieve its intended 
effect to lower rates further.
V. CONCLUSION
 Unfortunately, signs of a recovery in hous-
ing are largely absent in today’s market.  One of 
the provisions of the Dodd-Frank bill was to give 
federal bank regulators the responsibility of defin-
ing a “Qualified Residential Mortgage” or QRM. 
According to the Center for Responsible Lend-
ing, the current proposal calls for a down pay-
ment of up to 20% on QRM loans, which would 
become the standard for a “safe” mortgage.  An 
analyst for the Pacific Investment Management 
Company (PIMCO) mentions this as an obstacle 
to the housing market’s recovery, because fewer 
people will be able to save up for a mortgage 
down payment, which has tempered demand. 
The lack of qualified buyers in the current housing 
market, along with the excess supply, means that 
the housing market appears to be depressed for 
the foreseeable future.
 For the broader jobs market, unemploy-
ment will be a lingering problem.  Despite a cor-
porate rebound since the financial crisis, profit 
margins have been helped most by streamlining 
and cost cutting rather than new hiring.  Another 
issue figures to be the labor force participation 
rate, which is the percent of the adult popula-
tion that includes itself in the labor force, that has 
fallen because of discouraged workers leaving 
the labor force.  Figure 4 illustrates the decline of 
this rate, which is at its lowest level since the ear-
ly 1980s.  As workers eventually reenter the work 
force when aggregate economic confidence 
picks up, they will put upward pressure on the un-
employment rate (Tasci, Zaman, 2010).  Therefore, 
while the unemployment rate is off its highs from 
2009 (Figure 5), it is unlikely to return to pre-crisis 
levels in the foreseeable future.
 Amid all of the financial reform and con-
sumer protection legislation, along with newfound 
public skepticism toward many financial institu-
tions, the joblessness in our economy is the larg-
est reminder of the crisis.  With jobs—and indus-
tries—being shipped overseas, it will be difficult 
to find the capital needed to stimulate housing 
demand from its current depressed state.  And 
while increasing employment has been the key 
focus of the policies of the Fed and Congress, 
prolonged expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy can have worrying implications in the long-
term.  With all of the liquidity that has been added 
to the economy, the M1 money stock (currency 
plus demand deposits) has doubled in the last 
decade (Figure 6), suggesting that inflation might 
be a future concern for the economy along with 
unemployment.  These systemic problems in our 
economy today can largely be traced to the 
housing crisis and subprime mortgage bust
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